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Frank Gardner remarks in ‘Europe,
Policies and People’ that the customs union
which effectively became the basis for the European
Union and European integration in general was ‘an
economic means to a political end’ (Gardner,
2002: 12). This paradox defines the structure of this
work. We will first look at what political goals European
countries are aiming for because the differences in
perceptions of federalism and intergovernmentalism
depend largely on historical and political experience
of a country. In the course of this we will consider
what impact the legacy of the Second World War has
been extracting on the way the politics of the European
Union is perceived by various statesmen and bureaucrats.
Drawing on this perspective, we will then be able
to move on to a more specific consideration of the
problems posed to the European business environment
by the political hurdles. By examining European integration
from the perspective of its ends and from where these
have originated from, we will be able to conceive
of an idea as to why today, despite many successes,
the EU and the project of European integration are
surviving a crisis.
Many scholars have agreed that the
model of European integration which they examine is
the product of the post-war stabilisation. Indeed,
the very idea of integration was introduced as a countermeasure
to war. A close economic collaboration between the
member-states was directed at prevention of war, as
well as at the re-conversion of the post-war economy
and the rebuilding of Europe. At the same time, when
Churchill spoke of the ‘United States of Europe’
in the early years of the war he meant not only a
political and cultural entity, but also an ideological
alliance against the Soviet bloc. With United Europe
beginning to develop during the Cold War and the Socialist
countries being eliminated from the Euro-American
sphere of influence (especially in the years from
the Warsaw Treaty of 1954 until its dissolution),
it becomes clear that the very idea of Europe which
used to dominate political and economic discussions
has become outdated in the years following the collapse
of the USSR and the end of the Cold War. One may conclude
therefore that between the Treaty of Rome in 1957
and the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 Europe existed as
an economic alliance with strictly political ambition
– to prevent war and to oppose the Soviet bloc,
and its own vitality can be described in Toynbeean
terms of challenge and response. It can also be interpreted
in the terms of a Realist discourse, which devotes
its attention to power-struggle; the problem, however,
is that today this concept loses its attractiveness,
as economic collaboration is more profitable and hence
desirable than the search for an obscure ‘enemy’.
As by now all past goals have been achieved: there
is no ideological or political enemy any longer, and
the problems Europe is facing are very often of cultural,
or even civilisational, quality. Hence the main challenge
for the EU today is self-reinvention in the face of
the absence of strictly political goals it used to
pursue.
At the same time one has to admit
that the EU can only vaguely be conceptualised. In
fact, it has always existed as rather a philosophical
concept than any stable and tangible political body.
One only has to read two articles from the Common
Provisions of the Treaty of the European Union, as
revised by the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 1 states
that ‘This Treaty marks a new stage in the process
of creating an even closer union among the people
of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly
as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’;
while Article 6 states that ‘The Union is founded
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule
of law, principles which are common to the Member
States’ (Nugent, 2003: 464-5).
What one notices is that these two
articles declare adherence to the democratic values,
but they do not provide the reader with an idea of
what exactly kind (i.e. form) of political alliance
the EU is. Most importantly, however, the vague adherence
to democratic values seems to have missed out on the
fact that with its enlargement the EU came to consist
of member-states whose democratic experiences vary
dramatically.
The abovementioned articles also
suggest that Europe has always been in transition,
that it is an extremely complex system, and the European
experience to-date plainly manifests that the EU is
unique (Nugent, 2003: 465). As Nugent remarks further,
this uniqueness does not mean that there should be
no attempts to conceptualise the EU. The problem,
however, if we turn out attention to the issues of
federalism and intergovernmentalism, is that the EU
combines institutions of both federalist and intergovernmental
nature, and the evolution of these institutions towards
either federalist or intergovernmental will never
go smoothly.
The state forms that are characteristic
of federalism and intergovernmentalism are federation
and a nation-state, respectively. While federation
has become the foundation principle for the countries
like the USA and Russia, it is clear that to create
a ‘European’ nation-state would be extremely
tricky, to say the least. Within the European boundaries,
federation sometimes failed to contain ethnic or other
difficulties, as we see from the examples of Yugoslavia
and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, Belgium shows
how federation ‘can be adapted to the needs
of a previously unitary state in which the component
parts are seeking greater approach’ (Bainbridge,
2002: 279). And such creation as Benelux shows that
sometimes the countries choose to integrate within
a political unit.
There are two models of federalism,
‘Hamiltonian’ that is effected through
institutions and ‘Proudhonian’ which is
based on free association motivated by common interests
(Bainbridge, 2002: 279). Evidently, ‘Hamiltonian’
federalism is perhaps more attractive and hence efficient,
as it suggests some sort of responsibility and a tenser
union for the common goal. It is this kind of federalism
that currently underpins some of the EU institutions
of essentially supranational character. Bainbridge
observes that as yet the European Commission has not
emerged as the real European government, with the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament as
the Upper and Lower chambers, respectively. Nevertheless,
it is these bodies that together with the Court of
Justice provide the European Community with its quasi-federal
structure (Bainbridge, 2002: 279-80).
The problem, however, is that federation
is very often seen as a centralised form of state
where decision are made at the top and distributed
to the component parts at the bottom. Curiously, in
this respect people tend to miss out on the fact that
the creation of nation-state the intergovernmentalism
unconsciously aims for is a much more centralist move.
But intergovernmental approach helps to create the
illusion of a free negotiation between the states,
which is an important European democratic experience.
This is the main reason why federation or federalist
discourse in general attracted so much criticism from
de Gaulle during Hallstein’s presidency and
from Thatcher during the presidency of Jacques Delors.
It is yet extremely amusing, as Bainbridge notices,
that whilst the phrase ‘of a federal type’
that described the EU as a political unit was removed
from the final draft of the Maastricht Treaty, some
typically and much more federalist provisions have
not only be left intact, but enjoyed a huge support
from the British public (Bainbridge, 2002: 280). Among
these are the fines imposed by the Court of Justice
on the defaulting member-states, and the doctrine
of subsidiary, which can only be meaningful, Bainbridge
explains, ‘in the context of a federal structure
in which there is a balance of power between the Union
institutions and national, regional or local authorities’
(ibid: 280).
Nevertheless, although federalist
institutions already underpin the structure of the
EU, the threat to sovereignty and democratic rights
that it potentially poses inhibits many minds. There
are suggestions that the main problem of the EU is
the distribution of information, and the main reason
people may be against federalism is because they do
not have a clear idea of what it is. Leonard successfully
challenges this view, but is unlikely to dismiss the
fears of ‘excessive’ European integration
altogether. Sovereignty is still at the top of agenda
for many politicians, as well as people.
But to preserve sovereignty essentially
means to seek to create a nation-state, which as we
said, would be rather difficult. One of the important
problems that needs to be taken into account is how
exactly the term ‘Europe’ is being understood.
The main similarity between how politicians and people
perceive the space to which they confine their hopes
and fears is that this space is increasingly often
seen as a monstrous amoeba, especially after the enlargement.
For politicians, this monster demands new approaches
and new governmental practice, which they are trying
to invent. For people, who are focused on more ‘earthy’
problems, like employment and earnings, Europe often
becomes a hurdle, - despite the almost unlimited migration,
- as well as a threat to national and cultural identity.
What is therefore clear is that, first; there is a
difference between the academic and non-academic view
of ‘Europe’ as an entity and of integration
as the modus vivendi for such entity. But, secondly,
as Rafael Delgado somewhat whimsically remarked, we
are dealing with the crisis of expectations, as ‘Europe
has been transformed from panacea into all-purpose
scape-goat in just 10 years’ (Leonard, 1998:
4).
Furthermore, if one directs attention
to the results of a research presented by Leonard
in his book that illustrates the way people perceive
their ‘European’ identity and the way
they link it to their more immediate ‘national’
identity, it becomes clear that, as we already noticed
with the term ‘Europe’, there is no spectacular
accord in opinions. Leonard observes that people tend
to feel the part of Europe, rather than the EU. One
in ten people felt their ‘European’ identity
to be stronger than their national identity (Eurobarometer,
1997). Two thirds of the UK citizens replied positively,
when asked ‘In addition to your own sense of
nationality, how European do you feel?’ (Leonard,
1998: 8). However, as Leonard states, when asked what
‘European’ means to people, they tend
not to mention the EU. Moreover, as the research indicates,
it is people from the countries outside the EU who
tend to associate themselves with the EU, rather than
people from the member-states. 59% of Poles and 42%
of Czech claimed that their ‘European’
identity (as associated with the EU) was as strong
as their national identity, which is statistically
higher than in any other member state at the time
(McKie, 1998). At the same time, as the following
chart illustrates, a great deal of people have a rather
vague idea of the EU is (Leonard, 1998: 31).
Diagram 1. How much do you know about the EU?
However promising or unpromising
these figures may look, one unfortunately has to be
conscious not to overestimate them, as feeling ‘European’
is challenged by national cultures, national education,
and the prospect of globalization. Even the migration
of people between England and Spain or France, for
example, does not always signify the adoption of the
language of the country. Even European immigrants
tend to live in their national communities, thus leaving
the door open for cultural alienation. The rare number
of bilingual people or those who speak a second language
not only helps to explain, why the idea of the EU
may be understood differently in different countries
across various social groups, but also indicates the
problems arising from the expansion of the labour
market. The migration of the labour force is hampered
by the linguistic unintelligence of this force, which
becomes a challenge to employers, employees and the
prospects of business. As for globalization, while
Europe may be the perfect space to attempt to formulate
and to implement the supranational type of the state
that so many theoreticians speak about, the view of
globalization that connects this process to the global
capitalism, imperialism, the power of transnational
corporations, does not allow for any positive or at
least unbiased estimation of it.
The crisis of expectations that Delgado
spoke of is clearly linked to the different views
of global society and economy that currently dominate
the sphere of discourse in the international relations.
As we mentioned it above, the idea of United Europe
began to be put into practice during the Cold War
period. Realist approach to politics was the dominant
one at the time, whereby the success of the idea depended
on the power-balance and the preservation of sovereignty.
The latter objective may be at odds with the scholastic
observation that the idea of a nation-state is currently
survives erosion due to migration and cultural and
national connections. Nowadays, with globalization
being at the top of the discourse, liberalist approach
with its focus on economic stimulation and social
policy is increasingly popular. The conflict over
the future of the EU very eloquently illustrates the
conflict between these two approaches to international
relations. It also explains why sovereignty is such
an issue. United Europe with its liberal economy but
realist concept of the state is spreading thinly to
create business-favourable conditions and to protect
the flow of labour forces, but at the same time it
seeks to preserve political values which are already
surviving crisis in the face of globalization and
the evolving idea of the state.
We are turning now to economic and
business integration within the EU. Leonard enlists
many traits that manifest amply for the advance of
integration, among which are cheaper and faster travel,
European restaurants and food, Euronews, not to mention
European sporting events and various cultural contests.
However, as Gardner stated, from the beginning of
the EU, money, agriculture and big businesses were
in the main focus of the policy-makers, which have
now materialised in the European Monetary Union, the
Common Agricultural Policy, and the Single European
Market, and the introduction of the euro in 1999 (Gardner,
2002: 13). One also has to add to this an essentially
bureaucratic and technocratic nature of early European
‘government’, to understand the diagram
2 below. Whilst on the one hand these measures create
a stronger sense of community and integration, they
contribute to the feeling of economic discomfort,
on the other. The infamous French vote of the EU constitution
in 2005 failed, and one of the reasons was the disappointment
from the introduction of the euro, which led to the
increase in prices; another reason was the growing
unemployment which has provoked many political crises
and is currently an issue for the ministers Sarkozy
and Villepin. One of the key issues of the economic
side of European integration is that the concept of
the single market that was endorsed by the Maastricht
Treaty in 1993 is profitable for only a tiny portion
of businesses and – by consequence – employees
and consumers. It also drew a line under the Cold
War period in development of the EU, but was not designed
to accommodate for the enlargement. Like in the years
immediately after the Second World War, it is agriculture
and underdeveloped regions that receive the closest
attention from the EU. This is unlikely to change
because many countries that have entered the EU in
the years from 2000 have previously been facing lower
economic tempos, in comparison to Western Europe.
As Nugent remarked back in 2002, the Common Agricultural
Policy would have been exacerbated by the inclusion
of the Eastern European countries, like Poland, Bulgaria
and Turkey, who’s large but not efficient agricultural
sectors would demand the increase of support from
the CAP. The EU also tend to favour high skills and
high income, thus supporting the image of ‘club-class’
that people have conceived of it over the years. All
this in total means that the EU would be having considerable
difficulties in providing the employment opportunities
for professionals and supporting small businesses
and professional sectors, but also in continuing to
finance the agricultural sector, fighting unemployment,
and battling the critique for ‘neglecting’
such sectors, as fishery.
We said previously that one of the
obstacles on the way to integration is the access
to information and its estimation. In spite of these
restrictions, surveys show that people have no doubt
as to what they expect from the EU to do:
- Fighting unemployment – 92 per cent
- Fighting poverty and social exclusion –
89 per cent
- Maintaining peace and security – 88 per
cent
- Protecting the environment – 85 per cent
(Leonard, 1998: 12).
As one can plainly see, neither money, nor agriculture,
nor single market interest people as much as the more
immediate goals associated with the basic well-being.
At the same time, if one looks at the current situation
in France, it becomes clear that a ‘centralist’
approach to the tackling of unemployment could have
helped to reduce country’s problems. It also
becomes clear that the gulf that used to be between
the popular and political understanding of the objectives
and the image of the EU is deepening, and as a result
the crisis of expectations is deepening, as well.
More and more often people begin to believe that politicians
disregard their opinion, especially in matters of
economy and business.
The percentage of people who think
that their countries do not benefit from the European
institutions is increasing dramatically, as the diagram
shows (Leonard, 1998: 14).
Diagram 2. The gulf between decision-makers
and the public.
However, the main problem remains
that of disproportionate distribution of the funds
between the sectors of economy within the EU. Many
analysts find startling the fact that forty years
on since the EU has begun to come into being, the
European ‘government’ continues to support
agriculture and heavy industry in favour to smaller
businesses in Europe. As we have just showed, this
can now be explained by the inclusion of the countries,
whose economy was agriculture-oriented for many decades
and even centuries. The employment of Turkish workers
on the German building sites, as well as the influx
of the Asian produce throughout Europe make the countries
and the EU look for the possibilities to regulate
the trade with these ‘outsiders’ or for
the ways to use national labour force, instead of
causing its migration.
We can see from another diagram how
the public supports the prospect of integration by
a social class (Leonard, 1998: 16). It is clear that
those who benefit the most are the most professional
or most mobile groups, like students, higher managerial
staff, professional workers, and white-collar employees.
But starting from small businesses supports decreases,
which is an ample manifestation of all the main problems
and criticisms that people veil against the EU.
Diagram 3. Support for integration by social group.
Note: Chart’s legend reads as follows: professionals,
students, employers, white collar employees, small
business owners, farmers, social workers, unemployed,
manual workers.
In France, in particular, there is
a tendency now to look for the means to support the
small businesses, which are likely to be engulfed
by either Asian businessmen or bigger companies. The
report prepared for the European Commission, entitled
‘Social policy and the European employment:
policy for the citizens’ (Politique sociale
et de l’emploi europeenne: une politique pour
les citoyens), looked at the comparative result between
the EU and the United States for the year 1997. Whilst
figures of those employed in the agricultural and
industrial sectors were very similar (agriculture:
EU – 3.0%, US – 2.0%, industry: EU –
17.8%, US – 17.7%), the numbers of those employed
in the social service sector differed dramatically:
EU – 39.7%, US – 54.3%. The number of
the unemployed was 39.5% in the EU and 26.0% in the
US (Politique…, http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/move/24/txt_fr.pdf:
10).
As we already said, the main difference
between federalist and intergovernmental approaches
is embedded in the international relations theory,
and thus effectively is the difference between liberal
and realist understanding of politics and its relation
to economy. Hence it is understandable that federalist
scholars tend to see integration as inevitable and
on-going process (Wayne Sandholtz, Alec Stone Sweet),
whilst intergovernmental view, most recently expressed
in the works by Andrew Moravcsik, takes domestic policy
into account to explain, how integration occurs at
the higher level. The main problem about intergovernmentalists
is that they tend to cling tightly to the domestic
policy, thus failing to recognise the role of supranational
bodies, like the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice, as well as of transnational actors,
like European firms and interest groups. They underestimate
the fact that potentially any business deal can have
far-reaching social and political implications not
only for a particular state, but for all countries
that are considered as its allies or economic and
business partners. Another criticism that is often
veiled against intergovernmentalism is that it tends
to ignore the ‘black box’ of the state.
Foster argues that intergovernmentalism is inadequate
in showing how governments choose their policy options:
‘the formation of objectives, the pursuit of
strategies and the final positions adopted are every
bit as disorderly and unpredictable as domestic policy-making.
Politics is not always a rational process: ideology,
belief and symbolism can play as important a role
as substance’ (Foster, 1998: 364).
This means that intergovernmental,
or state-centrist, or even consociationalism are not
particularly effective models for European integration
because in their tangible form they need to rely on
a strong sense of national character, which as for
now is only slowly emerging. However, they are ineffective
if they are preferred to any other form of integration.
As we noticed, the EU is a for ever evolving organism,
which means that to apply one unmodified model of
cooperation and integration would be a mistake because
one such model would be inadequate. The success therefore
lies, probably, in what McKay suggested in his book,
‘Federalism and EU’: ‘…not…
to completely remove and replace what is the dominant
intergovernmental or realist model of European integration,
but rather to supplement it by taking into account
federal thought and practice. It is no longer acceptable
to subsume federalism within the overall theoretical
category of neofunctionalism, where it conveniently
disappears from view. Instead, it is necessary to
construe the federal idea as a model in its own right…
in order to better understand the EU, we need a model
which effectively combines IR theory, European-level
analyses and national domestic concerns. Federalism
as an organising principle would sit comfortably in
each of these broad interconnected and overlapping
approaches…’ (McKay, 2002: 274).
Bibliography
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3. Foster, A. (1998). ‘Britain and the Negotiation
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4. Gardner, Frank, Hatt, Sue (eds.) (2002) Europe,
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5. Leonard, Mark (1998). Rediscovering Europe. London:
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6. McKay, D. H. (2002). Federalism and EU: a Political
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