Concept of Social Construction in terms of its Development in Sociology

This essay attempts to outline the concept of social construction in terms of its development in sociology while considering in what ways the concept may be critiqued. In order to do so, the essay will be divided into three main parts, the first of which will be an exploration of the concept of social construction, so that a clear understanding of it is achieved at the outset. The second part traces the concept of ‘social construction’, as a sociological perspective, historically within the development of the discipline, and accounts for the reasons that gave its birth as an influential ‘player’ in modern social theory. The third and final part of the essay attempts, by means of conclusion, to re-address ‘social construction’ critically, by assessing its merits and outlining its possible limitations as a theoretical mode of sociological inquiry.
Starting with the unavoidable task of definition and clarification of the conceptual apparatus we shall be using throughout the essay, we may describe social construction in a broad sense as the particular sociological viewpoint which suggests that reality is socially constructed by means of a process through which facts, knowledge and truth are discovered, made known, reaffirmed and altered by members of society (Newman 1997, Restivo 1991, Jenkins 2002). Borrowing heavily from the interactionist perspective which suggests that social reality is symbolically constructed though people’s actions and interactions with each other, the constructionist view envisages social reality as the product of people’s actions intended or inherited. Constructionists claim that it is we who shape our own destiny by means of identification and it is equally we who are so susceptible to the power of socialization (inheritance and reproduction of cultural norms we have ‘learned’ from our background, culture and society). Particular emphasis is placed on the notions of identity and difference in shaping the social contexts we enter and/or create by making the claim that ‘what we are like’ and ‘what we unlike’ as Jenkins (2002:69) puts it, is crucial in producing a sense of place in the social world we inhabit. According such a perspective, the dyad of identity and difference is seen as deriving from social and cultural processes. These processes create systems of ideas and practices about social phenomena (such as gender or race) that vary across time and space and morph into ideologies and myths that set out (as biased symbolic cultural representations) to describe people and social groupings. It is the dialogic relationship between identity and difference that creates social divisions and gives rise to notions of social diversity and identity for describing the social space we live in. As can be seen from above, constructionism is generally characterized by its critical stance towards ‘taken for granted’ knowledge adopting the view that knowledge is sustained by social processes and thus is socially constructed. In its effort to reach such a conclusion and establish itself as a viable sociological perspective, social constructionism has attacked two particular ideas (namely essentialism and biological determinism) and has emerged as their theoretical and ideological rival in explaining social evolution, action and change. As a means of understanding what makes social construction a distinct theoretical perspective it seems incumbent upon the scope of this essay to define it in opposition to these two approaches given that such logic is inherent in the constructionist argument; if identity is defined by means of opposition then surely the social construction approach should be defined by its opposition to essentialism and biological determinism which we shall address in turn. Essentialism assumes some essential, innate and universal feature that identifies the phenomenon under study. Essentialist approaches to gender for example assume that all women share traits in common, as do all men. Essentialism could alternatively be defined as faith in certainties, ‘grand narratives’ and common standards as these are shaped and channelled by mainstream society. Biological determinism on the other hand stresses the importance of biology in explaining gender difference. Biological determinists highlight similarities in male behaviour across different environments. They argue that male traits (whether a preference for competitive sport, or a lack of ‘maternal’ feeling) have their roots in chromosomal differences (XY rather than XX chromosomes), hormonal differences (for example, testosterone) or some other natural characteristic that distinguishes men from women.
It is clear then from above that the social construction approach is the ultimate semantic opposite of these two notions which not only have prevailed in explaining human behaviour in non-sociological explanations but have also installed themselves in the public mind as commonsense ‘facts’, a trend which the advocates of the social construction approach should like to reverse with their writings and distinct perception of the social world as an arena where competing descriptions of social reality (or discourses) antagonise each other by means of identification and differentiation and above all by taking the stance that this social world that we so evasively and abstractly talk about is nothing but the product of our own actions and the socially constructed symbolic representations we hold of it.
Having outlined the main tenets of the social construction approach as it appears in sociology, it is now time to move to our second theme which is nothing but a ‘developmental delineation’ of the constructionist perspective in sociology by attempting to explain it further through looking at how it came to gain such momentum and widespread criticism in current sociological discussions.
To do so one would have to accept that different historical conditions produce different modes of thinking about them and sociology is no exception. It is rather clear that different epochs beg for answers to different questions and the kinds that were relevant in the distant past may be much less so in the present or the future and to that the constructionist approach too is no exception either. The questions which were pressing for the sociological founding fathers were evolving as time went by and new societal formations, thinkers and explanations emerged to reflect the social environment in which they were born. If for Marx and Weber power, status, economy, ideology and conflict were of key importance and for Durkheim it was society’s dissolution to normlessness and anomie, for contemporary advocates of the social construction approach it is questions of social diversity and identity that matter the most and we shall see how this shift unfolded historically in the growth of the sociological discipline. The founding sociologists were well aware of the profound transformations inherent in the shift to modernity, but they differed greatly in their views on the possibilities and pitfalls represented by this new society. Among those committed to social progress, some were reformist (for example Durkheim) while other sought radical change (for example Marx). In both cases, there was optimistic belief that modernity could bring about ‘the good society’ despite fears about the consequences and harrowing prospects of modernity as expressed by Weber which have strong resonance today. Classical social theory (of the kind described above) however, neglected questions of gender and sexual inequality and mainstream sociology has only relatively recently recognised the significance of gender relations, largely as a result of their impact of a variety of feminist theories.
A number of humanistic perspectives place their main emphasis not on structural causes and constraints but on the creative human actor who negotiates situations and identities purposefully and resourcefully in face-to-face settings.
These approaches (for example, symbolic interactionism) tend to assume that actions make sense if they are understood on their own terms and in the context of their particular setting; consequently these theories tend to advocate social tolerance of diverse norms and identities.
Phenomenology and ethnomethodology place rather less stress on conscious motives and reflection by the actor. Instead, an essentially changing and precarious social world is maintained unwittingly through shared meanings and practical social skills.
Post-structural social theory decentres the subject by proposing the self as a product of language rather than seeing language more conventionally as a resource of the self.
Post-structuralists do not see language as creative social action. For them language, texts and discourses construct and direct our knowledge of the world and shape our identities: the autonomous subject is a fiction and the search for truth is fruitless.
From this rather limited summary of key sociological debates throughout time it may have been clear that contemporary societies are acquiring a qualitatively new form of culture and social structure and it is worth questioning whether these changes can be best understood through the theories of postmodernism or through the constructionist approach which not unlike postmodernism seeks a re-affirmation of agency and the self, as well as the reflexive use of knowledge by members of society to shape their own future. For many sociologists this has been a key development in both sociology and the societies it describes and from explanations of factors we have moved to explanations of actors. Many like Giddens and Beck have seen the rise of identity or life politics, transforming the political from a distant, authoritative discourse to a reflexive self-checking and critical doubt about how ‘we’ act, questions which are tangent to the constructionist approach. If in the modernist era sociologists were concerned in describing structures in our brave new post-modern world sociologists are interested in describing the interrelation of self and society in producing social reality or socially constructed /conditioned reality. If it is so can we illustrate this development of the social construction approach in sociology not just historically but with publicly relevant and applied sociological examples? I believe that by dedicating the remainder of this section to a discussion of two key social divisions namely sexuality and gender this development of the constructionist view can be clearly seen and assessed critically in the final part of the essay.
If for a large part of sociological theory individuals of opposite sexes were seen as robots controlled by forces beyond their reach and human behaviour and social interaction is explained in terms of the costs, benefits and even strategies of genes engaged in a competitive struggle for survival as Shilling (1993:50) notes, for constructionism sex and society are by no means separate from each otherand sexuality is not given and is product of negotiation, struggle and human agency. Where theorists such as Straus (cited by Young 2003) consider the weaker power muscle of the girl as an explanation of difference by referring to a “feminine attitude” in relation to the world and to space, constructionists envisage sexuality as something which society produces in complex ways; a result of diverse social practices that give meaning to human activities, of social definition and self-definition, of struggles between those who have power to define and regulate and those who resist.
Having so far offered a comprehensive outline of ‘social construction’ and discussed its development in sociology it is reasonable to critically assess it in the remainder of the current paper.
Following the fate of most sociological perspectives, the strengths of the constructionist standpoint are at the same time its weaknesses and vice versa. Whatever its merits may be (and as we’ve seen these are very and many) it has serious limitations too.
First of all it can often be thought as inadequately theorised primarily because of the insistence of the argument that social reality cannot be organised differently and thus assumes a kind of dogmatic quality which is often disrespectful of other perspectives regardless of their contributions.
Secondly and most importantly, It is constantly failing to discuss the exact source and specific dimensions of ‘construction’; who does the constructing, for what reasons and under what circumstances? One could offer many explanations to that but none have been clearly put forward by constructionists themselves. In other words advocates of social construction seem to be overwhelmingly interested in their perspective without having invested much effort to convince others on the truths it reveals based on pure reasoning and argumentation which should be refreshingly free from heated or ideologically rooted debate as it is often the case.
Thirdly, it has a strict set of beliefs and makes it difficult to argue with and thus does not allow exchange and fluctuation of competing discourses which is one of the basic characteristics of sociology. Constructionists’ commitment to their thesis is admirable but difficult to manage in a dialogic context such as sociological discussion probes and encourages.
Fourthly, it fails to merge with the facts of biological difference by rejecting them altogether without leaving much space for their critical dissection.
Lastly, it criticises essentialism but moves on to create another form of essentialism based on the ‘grand narrative’ that ‘everything is socially constructed’ which in itself is as totalitarian and abusive assumption as is essentialism and biological determinism although rendered in constructionist terms.
Having traced its intellectual journey within sociology and assessed its theoretical contributions, we shall conclude with a plea to envisage social construction as a critical perspective which has offered sensational disclosures on one hand but has not been able to escape the confines of single-minded faithfulness to its propositions leading often to the isolation of the public that constructionists wish to address and enlighten.