In what ways did the senators gain or lose from Augustus' Principate?

The Principate of Augustus, which was the bridge between the Roman Republic and the Imperial Period, was of the utmost importance in Roman history. When this period actually started is a matter of some debate. Perhaps cautioned by the example of his adoptive father, Julius Caesar, Augustus’ journey to supreme power was made up of a number of steps, some of which appeared to be steps back, and the supreme power itself derived from a collection of ordinary constitutional powers and extraordinary but legally bestowed powers. 23BC seems the best date, if a date has to chosen, as this was the “second settlement” which granted Augustus tribunician power without holding the role of tribune, and maius imperium (greater authority)over all Roman provinces. These powers, of course, impinged on the power of senators. Tribunician power allowed Augustus to call meetings of the senate and apply a veto to their decisions if he so wished. maius imperium granted him higher authority than the (senatorial) magistrates who had been commissioned to rule provinces. The characteristic feature of the beginning of what would become imperial rule was the increase in Augustus’ power until it was greater than that of any magistrate, and the corresponding reduction in the real power of the nobility, the senate and elected magistrates (many of whom were the same people). More than any other part of Roman society, “we tend to see a group of families, the republican ‘nobility’, as the losers” in the new regime. But what, exactly did they lose?
In the centuries immediately preceding the Civil War which left Augustus in charge of the Roman Empire, Rome had been ruled by elected magistrates such as quaestors, praetors and consuls. Rules about who could hold these magistracies, at what age and for how long, had been formulated over the centuries since the fall of the monarchy until an accepted route through political life, the cursus honorum, was formalised. Those qualified by age and a minimum level of landed wealth (400,000 sesterces) were eligible to stand for the lower levels of public office. A magistracy entailed automatic admission to the senate, where the decisions that affected the empire were made. Success in obtaining a more junior magistracy (the quaestorship) opened up the route to more senior roles in the fullness of time, with the ultimate ambition being the consulship. This in turn led to a pro-consulship as the governor of a province, a wonderful opportunity for enriching oneself, rewarding friends with lucrative posts, and gaining further supporters.
Normally there were only two consuls in each year so competition could be fierce. As well as success in war and a good name, the factors which influenced the election of a consul were networks of friends and supporters (patrons and clients), and winning the love of the common people of Rome by giving exciting shows and building grand monuments. Wealth was required to successfully walk the cursus honorum, one’s own or that of a patron, but the financial rewards were considerable and the rewards in terms of status immeasurable. A consul had the highest status in the senate and was the first to speak on any topic, followed by ex-consuls. Consulships were only held for a year and it was uncommon to hold the consulship often, but once a man had been a consul he would always have consular status and his family would be among the nobiles, the aristocracy of Rome.
When Augustus became the leading man in Rome, the life of the senate and the cursus honorum continued. On a superficial level, nothing had changed. There were still consuls each year, and after 23BC Augustus stopped accepting one of the consulships for himself, freeing both up for the senators. There were still elections for magistrates, and ex-magistrates could still govern provinces. Augustus even increased the depleted numbers of the patrician families (families with historical high status, whose members were the only men qualified for certain priesthoods) and reduced the numbers in the senate (swollen during the Civil War) to a more traditional figure. At a deeper level, however, everything had changed.
Augustus’ actions in promoting certain families to patrician status meant that they had strong links of gratitude to him and felt compelled to support him. His elevation of some of his supporters from the Civil War to senatorial status had the same effect. Augustus’ supreme position meant that he was able to recommend certain people to the consulship and other posts in the certainty of seeing them elected. One of the first moves of Augustus’ successor, Tiberius, was to acknowledge, supposedly on Augustus’ orders, that the elections of magistrates was a mere formality and contesting the elections was pointless. The overall effect was that Augustus to a large extent had the senate in his pocket. The term of the consulship was also shortened so that after 5BC it became normal for consuls to serve for only six months. This increased the number of men who could achieve consular status but reduced the power and influence of the consuls, especially in comparison with Augustus and his delegates (such as Agrippa) who had powers voted to them for terms of five years, ten years, or even indefinitely.
Furthermore, Augustus greatly reduced the opportunities for glory and enrichment in the provinces. From the time of the ‘first settlement’ of 27BC the provinces of Gaul, Spain, the Rhine and Danube areas, Syria, the Levant and Egypt were under his control, and the majority of them stayed that way. All new gains to the empire also fell under Augustus’ control so that gradually more and more of Rome’s territory was under his command. In practice this meant that Augustus was able to appoint legates to rule these provinces entirely at his own discretion, from the ranks of the senators or from outside the senate. He could also appoint the procurators of taxes (who were not usually senators) to these provinces. The reorganisation of the army under Augustus’ supreme command completed the picture: there was now very little opportunity for senators to gain glory or riches abroad without Augustus’ patronage, and far less opportunity to reward their supporters with posts once they were in the provinces. Even the control of the city of Rome’s services, from the fire brigade to the police to the grain supply, fell into Augustus’ hands, by legitimate senatorial vote but at his request.
Even if a senator did achieve great conquests in the provinces, as some still did, they could not look forward to the recognition and rewards at home to which such victories would previously have entitled them. A conquering general would have been hailed as imperator and would be voted a triumph by the senate. This meant that instead of laying down his imperium (commanding authority) at the edge of the city of Rome he would be allowed to proceed through the streets of the city in full military apparel, displaying the fruits of his conquest, material and human, to the populace. Augustus stopped this tradition after 19BC. No triumphs were allowed to be celebrated except by himself and members of his family. Instead, victories were credited to Augustus as the supreme commander, and the senators who had won the battles had to be content with less public commendation. The title of imperator became exclusively the right of the Princeps.
Other traditional displays of wealth and status which had been the right of the senatorial class were banned, reduced or closely controlled. Public festivals were put under the control of praetors, with official funds to call on, which stopped candidates for office competing to outdo each other in pomp and gaining popular support. Gladiatorial games were not allowed without permission from the senate, and some public banquets were reduced in scale while others were abolished altogether. The common people would not feel the loss of them because Augustus’ lavish entertainments and shows had no such limits imposed on them, but now he had no rivals in this courtship of the common people. Finally, monuments emblazoned with the names of patrician families and currency with their family images and emblems were phased out. Senators retained the right to strike coins, but only members of the Princeps’ family on currency were acceptable. Much of what was understood by being a senator, or at least a nobilus, had been lost. As Syme puts it, “For the nobiles, no more triumphs after war, no more roads, temples and towns named in their honour and commemorating the glory of the great houses that were the Republic of Rome.” “There was no field left for them for action – or even for display.” The only route now open to an ambitious senator was to become a courtier, a flatterer of the new king.
Why had the senators given up all this glory and power? For it has to be remembered that the senate conspired in its own emasculation by granting Augustus all the powers he asked for and some that he didn’t. The answer lies in the period before Augustus’ Principate. The murder of Julius Caesar in 44BC sparked a civil war which was to rage for fifteen years. Alliances were made and broken as the great houses of the Roman Republic gave their allegiance to different factions. Octavian, as Augustus was then called, was a member of the winning faction and as such could claim to have been on the side of Rome against her enemies. More importantly, he could portray himself as the bringer of peace. In his Res Gestae he writes:
The doorway of Janus Quirinus [in the temple of Janus] which our ancestors wanted to be closed when peace on land and sea was secured by victories throughout the whole empire of the Roman people, and from the time of the city’s foundation until before my birth tradition records that it was only shut twice; [however] when I was the leading citizen the senate ordered it shut three times.
This claim to be a bringer of peace was supportable. Although Octavian had been a major instigator of the Civil War, his Principate did bring internal peace to Rome for a century, from the Battle of Actium in 30BC until the end of the Julio-Claudian dynasty in 68AD.
The period before this Civil War was also far from peaceful. Throughout the first century BC various leading men in Rome had risen up, one after another, trying to grasp control of Rome, with greater or lesser degrees of success but always with bloodshed and turmoil. During this time the support of the masses had become more important as men sought unconstitutional powers, and the support of the army became absolutely crucial. The ability of a commander to provide his soldiers with booty and with a comfortable living upon retirement guaranteed not only his political success, based on their votes, but also his ability to use these troops against the authority of Rome in order to get what he wanted, however illegal. Troops had entered the city of Rome – an act which had always been forbidden, vicious proscriptions had been carried out and if bad luck or bad judgement left senators on the wrong side of a power struggle it could be fatal.
In conditions like this the cursus honorum was rather meaningless; power came at the point of a sword. Augustus, by his final victory, put an end to all this and took steps to see that it did not happen again. Rates of pay and discharge bounty were fixed, as was the size of the army which previously had been raised according to need. Terms of service were increased, an oath of loyalty to Caesar was introduced, and in short the army became professional rather than a hired mob. The events of the sixty years preceding the battle of Actium had perhaps convinced the senators that the system as it stood could never fix itself. It was too prone to throwing up competitors for power who would leave Rome bloodied. Keeping one of these dictators in power to prevent further strife may have seemed like the best option. As Syme says, “If despotism was the price, it was not too high.” The senators had exchanged power and the chance of pre-eminence for peace.
Of course, the new despotism was not entirely safe, particularly for the old ruling class. In the latter part of his reign Augustus was famed for his clementia (mercy to enemies) but the start of his reign was not marked by this quality. Hundreds of equestrians and senators were killed on Augustus’ orders at Perugia during the Civil War and after the war he killed the children that Cleopatra and Antony had by other partners, even though they were related to him by marriage and one may have been the son of his adoptive father. Even during the Principate Augustus was prepared to use extreme measures, not only against those who conspired against him, as in the case of Murena and Fannius Caepo, but also against those who threatened his pre-eminence. A young senator, Egnatius Rufus, became very popular with the masses in the late 20s BC when he set up a fire brigade at his own expense, fire being a constant peril at Rome. When his popularity meant that it looked as if he would be successful in his bid to become consul before the legal age, Augustus had him executed as a conspirator, turning the fire brigade over to public control. His only crime was popularity like that of the great men earlier in the century, but high flyers would not be tolerated in the new regime. Survival meant keeping one’s head down, and success was only safe when it came from Augustus’ hand.
However, while broadly speaking it is true that the senators gave up power for peace, such a conclusion ignores the fact that the senators were not a uniform group, especially after the effects of the Civil War. There had always been ‘new men’ in the senate, but after the fighting decimated the ranks of the old houses and the Triumvirs elevated many of their friends to the senate, they were more prevalent than ever. ‘New men’ had traditionally been unlikely to rise high in the senate, reserving their hopes for their children and grandchildren. Now the favour of the emperor could bring quick progress and undreamed-of honours. Augustus’ attitude to the senate can be perceived as anti-nobiles because they were the greatest threat to his pre-eminence, but while the nobiles made up a large part of the senate they were not the whole of it.
The great names of the Republic disappeared from public life, names such as Scipio, Metellus, Lucullus and Hortensus, but new families arose to take their place. These senators gained power rather than losing it in Augustus’ Principate. Equally, those of the old families who were willing to become courtiers to the Princeps could do very well, some marrying into Augustus’s family and going on to become the ancestors of future emperors, others being promoted by him to be patricians. “Upper-class survivors found that slavish obedience was the way to succeed,” says Tacitus, “both politically and financially,” and succeed many of them did. Tacitus deplored this adulatio on the part of the noble families but for those who were prepared to sacrifice not only their power corporately but also their dignity individually, the Principate of Augustus was a time of great opportunity.
Despite the rewards open to individuals who cultivated Augustus and his family, the broader picture was much bleaker for the senate. They had gained peace, along with the rest of Roman society. They had also gained stability, even if it was a monarchy that was stable. Safety was not guaranteed but the danger from one ruler was less than the danger from a number of competing rulers. In exchange for this, however, the senators had given up not only their ability to direct the destiny of Rome, but also the trappings of their status, the rewards of their success, the public ostentation of their role in society. They senate had lost its character as a governing body and senators as a body had therefore lost their raison d’etre. Almost as much as the scrabble for imperial succession, the defining feature of the Imperial Period of Rome was the ineffectiveness of the senate, reduced to little more than a rubber stamp for the Emperor. In Augustus’ Principate the senators gained their survival, and sometimes even achieved great success as individuals, but as a group they lost almost everything that had made senators who they were in the Republic.