Do democratic states fight each other?

It is commonly believed in political thought that two democratic nation-states would not fight one another. Russett and Antholis have noted that this phenomenon is not because democratic states are innately more peaceful, but borne out by the simple fact that democracies are on the whole much less likely to attack one another than comparisons which can be made with others systems of governance and authority such as military dictatorships.
Important theoretic stances taken by academics when explaining the fact that democracies rarely fight each other are that of normative explanations and structural explanations. The normative model would be related to the argument that democracies do not fight each other because of the way that methods of compromise and cooperation are used in order to resolve dispute, as they are fairly sure that other democratic states will conform to the same norms as they do. Normative analysts can be traced back to thinkers such as Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson.
Structural models of explanation concentrate on the institutional constraints that prevent democracies from waging war against one another. It is argued that the institutional processes inherent in modern democracy and the need for general acceptance and legitimisation make it difficult for democracies to wage wars without a definite cause, something that is not a constraint in non-democracies, which only require the consent of power-holding elites. Other factors that figure in the equation include common interests: liberal democracies share many of the same goals and will often trade with one another and have many linkages of a formal and informal nature.
Maoz and Russett support the view that both these models of explanation are valid in explaining why democracies do not fight each other, but come down on the side of normative factors as holding a more constant explanation. Normative factors tend to prevent conflict from occurring altogether, whereas structural factors allow for some lower-level “tough bargaining”, which stops short of all-out war. Quantitative analysis was used by Maoz and Russett to gain as thorough a conclusion as possible. A general method of testing this hypothesis which is used regularly is quantitative and statistical analysis of conflict data and the creation of equations to allow for general trends to be discovered. Often this is then related to empirical analysis.
In order to widen the scope of classifications of democracy, Russett and Antholis used the example of an ancient democracy which conducted a war against another democracy- the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Syracuse. Of course direct parallels cannot be drawn between these states and states of the modern era, as the institutional systems in ancient times were a lot less complicated or formal and political bureaucracy as we know it was nonexistent. Ancient democracy was not set as a standard as it began to be in the 19th Century, and although the demos had a much greater input in decision-making, citizenship was limited, this combined with the lack of modern institutional restraints makes analysis of these ancient states propensity to war rather more complicated. However, in an analysis of the democracies and non-democracies (with other variants and definitions defined), Russett and Antholis discovered that even in ancient times, democracies were far less likely to fight each other than they were to fight non-democracies, and that non-democracies were more likely to fight any other adversary. The evidence supporting the hypothesis that democracies do not fight each other is in the ancient case rather mixed due to insufficient and unbiased data for research from ancient times.
An important issue that is raised in this article, and which can be applied to other democracies, is that avoiding wars with other democracies and also actively supporting democracies if they decide to go to war reinforces the democratic system within that particular country. It can be inferred from this that by undermining or attacking another democratic state one is also undermining the legitimacy of the democracy that is installed within one’s own country, and by bringing this into question it leaves the state open to attacks from within.
It is also noted that despite the empirical evidence that democratic states do not fight each other, they are nevertheless about as likely to go to war as other states (just not against other democratic ones). One only has to look at the United States and its various attempts to “spread democracy” to see a contemporary example of this. This is explained by Maoz and Russett by the fact that states ultimately put their survival first and if they believe that they are compromising their security or position by adhering to pacifist norms then they are more likely to break them.
However, the question of whether “democratic” states fight one another comes down to a more fundamental question, as to how one defines “democracy”. This is not a question which contains clear-cut answers. One could state that democracies have a number of fundamental institutions and beliefs that can be defined as essential to the functioning of a democratic state- for example, belief in “one man one vote”, a separation of the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government, free and fair elections, and an assortment of rights including the “right to free speech”, the “right to private property”, for example. Beyond this, there are cultures, perceptions and norms that allow democratic states to compromise and resolve peacefully conflict which may arise without the use of the threat of violence. Democracy is traditionally based on the will of the people and the right to freedom of diversity of opinion.
However, there is a thin and thick end to the wedge of democratic rights and accountability; no one would suggest that some of the “democratic” states in Africa for example afford its citizens the same degree of safeguards and rights as may exist in more established Western democracies. This is a point that it is important to bear in mind when assessing this question, as the strength or stability of the democratic institutions can have an effect on the outcome. Mansfield and Snyder have noted that historically and contemporarily, states that are in the transitional process of democratisation or from democratisation to another form of regime, are likely to engage in conflicts, and this is important to bear in mind for those who promote or attempt to enforce democracy as the best alternative for all